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Director of Central Intelligence

28 July 1950

Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates

IAC Coordination of IM-312: "Prospects for an Early Successful Chinese Communist Attack on Taiwan"

This paper, which was produced at the request of Mr. George Kennan and for which an urgent deadline was set for 1700, Friday, 28 July, was circulated in draft form to the IAC agencies on Wednesday, 26 July, and a meeting called under the "Urgent" coordination procedure for 1600, Thursday, 27 July.

This meeting lasted until 2145 hours and during its course the paper was considerably revised and somewhat watered down from the original CIA position. The paper was, however, declared acceptable by the representatives of all four agencies who left promising to obtain official concurrence in time to allow printing and dissemination before the close of business on 28 July.

The representative of the Department of State telephoned at 0915 hours on 28 July to say that his organization concurred without comment, and a similar message was received from G-2 via Colonel Tally at 0950. At about 1100 a spokesman for Admiral Johnson called to say that ONI was forwarding a concurrence with comment and desired assurances that the comments would be printed. Upon being informed that this course could not be followed, he stated that ONI would be forced to dissent, and a brief written dissent over Admiral Johnson's signature arrived about an hour later. ONI, in its dissent, took the position that no paper on this subject had any validity unless it could take into account the capabilities of US forces to defend the island. In other words, they dissented because of lack of information which the Navy itself had declined to give CIA.

A telephone message to Colonel Wackwitz of A-2 during the morning revealed that he was closeted most of the morning with General Cabell in an attempt to arrive at a form of dissent which would satisfy the General. At 1510 a civilian analyst from A-2 arrived with a document, of which a copy is attached, signed by General Cabell. Upon seeing the document, I telephoned Colonel Wackwitz and told him that we could not accept it as a dissent. I added that it was an attempt to rewrite the paper as the Air Force would have written it had they been responsible for its production and that it could not be accepted in that form as a dissent. I further offered to have someone in ORE draft a version of the Air Force dissent in a form which we would be able to publish and sent it over for checking by General Cabell. I also told Colonel Wackwitz that since the deadline was long since past, no Air Force dissent could be disseminated with the paper but that a

2 copies
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note would be included stating that the dissent would be disseminated separately to all recipients of the original document. Colonel Wackwitz called back thereafter to say that this was unacceptable to General Cabell, and that the General took the line that he had signed the paper already submitted and that it must stand as his dissent. I replied that I regretted this but that it could not be published in its present form under our interpretation of DCI 3/2, paragraph 5.

About half an hour later General Irwin telephoned and wanted to know if the paper had been disseminated. I told him that I thought I could stop it and he said that he had not yet read it and therefore no official Army concurrence could accompany it. I informed him that Colonel Tally had given us a full concurrence that morning. General Irwin said that while he did not blame us for assuming the official nature of such a message, nevertheless Colonel Tally was at fault in having given it without referring the paper to General Irwin. I was able to catch the first two copies which were about to be dispatched to Mr. Armstrong, and had the concurrence note at the bottom of the first page changed in pen to indicate the non-receipt of any comment from the Army. Ten more copies have been similarly treated, and the rest are being held in ORE pending clarification of General Cabell's position and the receipt of General Irwin's concurrence or dissent.

It would have been far preferable, in my opinion, to receive three dissents to the original and stronger version of the paper than to have watered it down as we did in an attempt to secure agreement. We now have two, and possibly three, dissents to a modified paper which we feel does not fully represent the CIA point of view. The need for the adoption of revised coordination procedures becomes even more evident in the light of this fiasco.

THEODORE BABBITT

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